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According to a recent decision of

POWER,

J., of the Chan-

cery Division of England, when a non-tidal river gradually
changes its bed, and thereby adds land to or takes
Accretions,
Rights of

it away from one side, the rule that the riparian

River-bed

Owner
owner on that side enjoys the gain or has to bear
the loss applies not only where two different persons own the
opposite banks, but also where the river bed belongs to a
separate owner, and not to the riparian owners; and further,
the question whether any particular land is part of the bed of
a non-tidal river at any particular spot or time is one of fact,
to be determined not by any hard and fast rule, but by
having regard to all material circumstances, including past and
present fluctuations of the river, and the nature, growth and
user of the land: Hindson v. Aslby, [1896] i Ch. 78.

In Xinnard v. State, 3"3 S. W. Rep. 234, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas has recently laid down some
Assault and special rules in regard to the admissibility of evidence in a prosecution for assault and battery
Battery,
Chastisement
of Pupil by
Teacher

committed by a teacher in punishing his pupil, as
follows :

(i) That in such a prosecution, an allegation that the
assault was committed with a special instrument, (e. g.,
switches,) has no effect other than to confine the state to the
proof of such means ;
(2) That when, in such a prosecution, the defence is that
the defendant, as a teacher, had the right to chastise his pupil,
evidence that the assault was so severe as to cause the blood
to flow from the pupil is admissible;
(3) That statements made by the teacher, half an hour after
the alleged assault, are not part of the res gesta, and are not
admissible in his favor;
88
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(4) That though the evidence showed that the assault was
so severe as to draw blood from the pupil in a number of
places, and the pupil offered no resistance; yet evidence of the
intention of the teacher in chastising the pupil is always
material, and should therefore have been admitted.
A teacher has a right to punish his pupils for rnisb~havior;
but this punishment must be reasonable, and proportioned to
the gravity of the pupil's misconduct; and must be inflicted
in the honest performance of the teacher's duty, not with the
mere intent of gratifying his private ill-will or malice. If it is
unreasonable and excessive, is inflicted with an improper
weapon, or is disproportioned to the offence for which it is
inflicted, the teacher will be guilty of an assault : Vanvactor
v. State, 113 Ind. 276; State v. Pendergrass, 19 N. C. 365;
State v. Stafford, Ii3 N. C. 635; s.c., i8 S. E. Rep. 256;
State v. Long, (N. C.) 23 S. E. Rep. 431 ; Spear v. State,
(Tex.) 25 S. W. Rep. 125. The punishment must be for
some specific offence which the pupil has committed, and
which he knows he is punished for: State v. Mizner, 50 Iowa,
If a person over the age of tventy-one voluntarily
145.
attends school, he thereby waives any privilege which his age
confers, and may be punished for misbehavior as any other
pupils : State v. JASncr, 45 Iowa, 248. A teacher has no
right, however, to punish a child for neglecting or refusing to
study certain branches from which the parents of the child
have requested that it might be excused, or which they have
forbidden it to pursue, if those facts are known to the teacher.
The proper remedy in such a case is to exclude the pupil from
the school : State v. AfiLner, 50 Iowa, 145 ; MorroW v. Wood,
35 Wis. 59The teacher has in his favor the presumption that he has
only done his duty, in addition to the general presumption of
innocence: Vanvactor v. State, I 13 Ind. 276 ; State v. ki'.Aner,
5o Iowa, 145 ; and in determining the reasonableness of the
punishment, the judgment of the teacher as to what was
required by the situation should have weight, as in the case of
a parent under similar circumstances. The reasonableness
must, therefore, be determined upon the facts of each particular
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case: Vanvactor v. State, I 13 Ind. 276. When a proper
weapon has been used, the character of the chastisement, as
regards its cruelty or excess, must be determined by considering the nature of the offence for which it was inflicted, the
age, physical and mental condition, as well as the personal
attributes of the pupil, and the deportment of the teacher:
Vanvactor v. State, 1 13 Ind. 276; Dowlen v. State, 14 Tex.
App. 61 ; and, since the legitimate object of chastisement is to
inflict punishment by the pain which it causes as well as the
degradation it implies, it does not follow that chastisement was
cruel or excessive because pain was caused or abrasions of the
skin resulted from the use of a switch by the teacher: Vanvactor v. State, 113 Ind. 276.
A teacher will be liable to prosecution, if he inflicts such
punishment as produces or threatens lasting mischief, or if he
inflicts punishment, not in the honest performance of duty, but
under the pretext of duty, to gratify malice: State v. Pendergrass, 19 N. C. 365; State v. Long, (N. C.) 23 S. E. Rep.
431. But a charge to the jury that "malice means bad
temper, high temper, quick temper; and if the injury was
inflicted from malice, as above defined, then they should convict the defendant," is erroneous; for malice may exist without
temper, and may not exist although the act be done while
under the influence of temper, bad, high or quick. General
malice, or malice against all mankind, " is wickedness, a disposition to do wrong, a black and diabolical heart, regardless
of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief." Particular malice
is "ill-will, grudge, a desire to be revenged on a particular person." This distinction should be explained to the jury, and
the term " malice " should be accurately defined: State v.
Long, (N. C.) 23 S.E. Rep. 43 1.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
California, an attorrney employed to draw a will is not liable
to a person who is deprived of that portion of the
Attorney,
estate, which the testator instructed the attorney
Negligence,
Liability to should be given to such person by the will by
Third Person reason of the negligence and ignorance of the
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attorney in the discharge of his professional duties: Buckley
v. Gray, 42 Pac. Rep. 9oo.
The Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit has
recently decided a very interesting point of law in regard to
Carriers,

Expulsion of
Passenger,
Ticket not
properly
stamped by
Agent

the right of a carrier to expel a passenger who
does not present a proper ticket. The plaintiff
had purchased from the defendant company a
round-trio ticket, one of the conditions of which
was that the return coupon would not be honored

for passage unless the passenger, before returning, was identified by the agent of the company at the place of destination,
and unless the coupon was signed by him, and witnessed and
stamped by the agent. This condition was printed on the face
of the ticket. The plaintiff, when about to return, presented
his ticket to the agent, signed it for the purpose of identification, and handed it to the agent, asking at the samne time for a
sleeping-car ticket. The agent took the ticket to the rear of
his office, and on returning with it, handed it to the plaintiff,
folded up with the sleeping-car ticket. He had, however,
omitted to stamp it. The plaintiff put the two tickets in his
pocket, without examining them, and did not discover the
agent's omission to stamp the ticket, until he was on the train,
returning homeward. On presenting the ticket, the conductor
refused it, and demanded the payment of fare from the plaintiff;
and on his refusal, ejected him. On these facts, the court held
that the plaintiff had done all that was required of him; that,
being justified by the circumstances in believing that the agent
had duly stamped the ticket, lie was under no obligation, when
it was handed back to him, to examine it to see whether the
agent had performed his duty; and that he was therefore
a legal passenger on the train, and entitled to recover damages
from the company for his expulsion: Mi-rtren.Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Pauson,7o Fed. Rep. 585.
The case of Bowers v. Pitts., Ft. Jfayne & Chic. R. R. Co.,
158 Pa. 302; S. C., 27 Atl. Rep. 893, was on all fours with
this, except as to one very important element. In that case,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a condition like
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the above, printed on the face of a ticket, was a valid condition,
and it was the passenger's duty to have informed himself of
its existence ; and that he could not recover for expulsion from
the train in consequence of a failure to present his ticket
properly stamped. Nothing is said, however, as to whether
he did or did not present the ticket to the agent to be stamped;
but the inference is that he did not do so. If that is the case,
the decision is correct; otherwise it is utterly indefensible.
As a general rule, a passenger has a right to rely upon the presumption that the ticket agent of a carrier will perform his duty,
and is not bound to examine his ticket to *see if it is correct,
unless facts exist which put him upon inquiry. Accordingly, if
the agent misdates the ticket, and the conductor or other person
who collects fares refuses to accept it in consequence, the passenger may recover damages in case of expulsion for refusal to
pay the fare demanded: Ellsworth v. C. B. & Q. Rj,. Co.,
(Iowa,) 63 N. W. Rep. 584; Tr-ice v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co., (W. Va.) 21 S. E. Rep. 1022. See Lahd v. Pittsbingh
Traction Co., r66 Pa. 4; S. c., 31 Atl. Rep. 51; 36 W. N. C. 24.
A gift by will "to the poor and the service of God"
is a good charitable gift: In re Darling,
Charity,
[1896] I Ch. 50.
GifttoPoor
The Court of Appeals of New York has recently held,
that a constitutional provision that " dues from corporations
Constitutional shall be secured by individual liability of the
stockholders to an additional amount equal to the
Law,
Self.executing
Provisions

stock owned by such stockholders, and such other
means as shall be provided by law," is not self-executing, and
is inoperative, until supplemented by statute: Marshall v. Szerman, 42 N. E.. Rep. 419, reversing 32 N. Y. Suppl. 193.
Judge TONE), of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County,
Kentucky, has lately rendered, in the case of Kaufman v.
Corporations, Louisville Gas Company, a very interesting and
decision in regard to the responsibility
Purchaseofall -prtant
the stock of

another,

Liability for
Torts of
Latter

impo

of one corporation, which has purchased all the
stock, property and franchises of another, and
united its business with its own, thus practically
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-consolidating it with itself, for the torts of the latter, committed after the union of interests. The facts were as follows:
The Louisville Gas Company, having been empowered to
make, distribute and sell electricity for illumination, and to
buy stock in other companies necessary or convenient for the
conduct of its business, bought up all the stock of the Louisville Electric Light Company. All of the original directors
of the latter company resigned, and a sufficient number of the
directors of the former were elected in their stead, one share
of stock being transferred to each to qualify him, the gas
company retaining possession of the rest. The vice-president
of the f)rmer was elected president of the latter, the latter's
office wa.z removed to tlat of the former, and the same office
thenceforth served for both.
The gas company guaranteed the mortgage debt of the
light company, assumed the payment of its floating debt,
guaranteed its contracts for the purchase of machinery, bought
and paid for machinery" to be used in operating the light ccmpan%-'s plant, and removed that plant to and incorporated it
with its own plant. The boilers of the light company's plant,
however, stijl continued to be operated at their former situation: and while so operated, one of them exploded, through
the negligence of the fireman, who was ostensibly an employe
of the light company.
Upon this state of fi.cts. the judge ruled as follows:
"As an independent corporation, solely responsible for its torts while
being thus used, the Electric Light Company has no legal existence. It
is either merged or suspended as to its corporate existence by reason of
the gas company owning it ' body and soul,' or it is a mere agent of the
gas company in manufacturing, distributing and selling electricity; and
if those theoretically the servants or employes of the Electric Light Company, in the line of the general business of the gas company conducted
by it, should commit a tort, the law will hold the principal responsible
accordiug to the very right and in despite of the legal fiction of a separate artificial existence of the Electric Light Company. The Louisville
Gas Company, since it purchased and became the owner of all the stock
of the Electric Light Company, its plant. machinery and franchise, since
it took control and management of the same for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing and selling electricity for illumination to the citizens
of Louisville, has been held out to and been regarded by the public to
be, as indeed it is in fact, the principal and owner in the manufacture,
distribution and sale of electricity for illuminating purposes by the use of

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

the plant and machinery which formerly belonged to the Electric Light
Company; and the law will hold it to maintain the truth of the situation,
and estop it from using the fictitious theoretic existence of the Electric
Light Company as a shield and defence against liability for the torts committed by employes in its business. From the foregoing it follows that
if the Electric Light Company's corporate existence is suspended, the gas
company is directly liable, if liability there be, for the explosion of the
boiler in question ; if the Electric Light Company's existence is not suspended, but it exists as a corporation, then, upon the facts heretofore
stated at length, it is and was the agent for the Louisville Gas Company,
which is liable for its torts."

The Supreme Court of Alabama has laid down the broad
rule, heretofore only acknowledged in case of a discharge, that
Criminal Law, an order of an examining magistrate, either committing or discharging the accused, is not a bar to
Hearing
a second hearing on the same charge: Robinson
before
Mlagistrate,

Twice in
Jeopardy

v. Dickcrsan, 18 So. Rep. 729. In this case, the
defendant had been admitted to bail by a magis-

trate, and on failure to gi.-e bail, had been committed to jail.
A second warrant was issued, and a second hearing had before
another examining power, (the city court,) and the defendant
was then committed without bail. An indictment was subsequently found against him for murder; and it was held, on
application, that the defendant was not entitled to a release on
giving the bail fixed at the first hearing.
In Davis v. Unitcd States, (not yet reported,) the Supreme
Court of the United States has recently enunciated a most
dangerous rule of criminal law,-that when the
CriminaiLaw, defence of insanity is set up, the burden of )!-oof
Insanity,

Burden of
Proof

rests upon the prosecution to establish the fact of

sanity, in spite of the presumption that
every man
is sane till proved insane.

"This view," says Mr. Justice Harlan, "is not at all inconsistent with
the presumption which the law, justified by the general experience of mankind aswell as by considerations of public safety, indulges in favorof sanity.
If that presumption were not indulged, the Government would always be
under the necessity of adducing affirmative evidence of the sanity of an
accused. But a requirement of that character would seriously delay and
embarrass the enforcement of the laws against crime, and in most cases be
unnecessary. Consequently the law presumes that every one charged with
crime is saue, and thus supplies in the first instance the required proof of
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capacity to commit crime. It authorizes the jury to assume at the outset
that the accused is criminally responsible for his acts. But that is not a
conclusive presumption, which the law upon grounds of public policy forbids to be overthrown or impaired by opposing proof. It is a disputable or,
as it is often designated, a rebuttable presumption, resulting from the connection ordinarily existing between certain facts-such connection not
being 'so intimate, nor so nearly universal, as to render it expedient that
it should be absolutely and imperatively presumed to exist in every case,
all evidence to the contrary being rejected; but yet it is so general, and
so nearly universal, that the law itself, without the aid of a jury, infers
the one fact from the proved existence of the other, in the absence of all
opposing evidence:" r Green. Ev. ?.38. It is therefore a presumption
that is liable to be overcome or to be so far impaired in a particular case,
that it cannot be safely or properly made the basis of action in that case,
especially if the inquiry involves human life. In a certain sense, it may
be true that where the defence is insanity, and where the case made by
the prosecution discloses nothing whatever in excuse or extenuation of
the crime charged, the accused is bound to produce some evidence that
will impair or weaken the force of the legal presumption in favor of
sanity. But to hold that such presumption must absolutely control the
jury until it is overthrown or impaired by evidence sufficient to establish
the fact of insanity beyond all reasonable doubt or to the reasonable
satisfaction of the jury, is in effect to require him to establish his innocence, by proving that he is not guilty of the crime charged.......
Strictly speaking, the burden of proof, as those words are understood in
criminal law, is never upon the accused to establish his innocence or to
disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime for which he is indicted.
It is on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial, and
applies to every element necessary to constitute the crime. Giving to the
prosecution, where the defense is insanity, the benefit in the way of
proof, of the presumption in favor of sanity, the vital question froni the
time a plea of not guilty is entered until the return of the verdict,
is whether upon all the evidence, by whatever side adduced, guilt is estabtablished beyond reasonable doubt. If the whole evidence, including
that supplied by the presumption of sanity, does not exclude beyond
reasonable doubt the hypothesis of insanity, of which some proof is
adduced, the accused is entitled to an acquittal of the specific offence
charged. His guilt cannot be said to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt-his will and his acts cannot be held to have joined in perpetrating the murder charged-if the jury, upon all the evidence, have a
reasonable doubt whether he was legally capable of committing crime, or
(which is the same thing) whether he wilfully, deliberately, unlawfully
and of malice aforethought, took the life of the deceased."

This doctrine i , in the highest degree, pernicious to the
successful enforcement of the laws against crime. In spite of
the feeble deprecation of that argument found at the end of
the opinion in this case, the fact remains that never yet in a
criminal case, has it been impossible for a defendant to procure
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so-called experts, often of the highest professional standing, who were then ready to swear to his insanity, and six
months later, on his application for release from an insane
asylum, were equally ready to swear to his sanity. This being
true, and the effect of professional dictatorialness on the lay
mind being equally well known, it follows that, in such cases,
there can never be a conviction, if the prosecution is required
to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the jury,
at their caprice, choose to disregard the evidence of the experts
for tne defence. For their evidence, positive as it always is,
is enough to create an uncertainty in any mind. not fitted by
the same special training to appreciate the basis of their opinions; and this uncertainty, as the language of Justice Harlan
clearly implies, need not be a reasonable one; a mere doubt,
however feeble, is, in his opinion, enough to throw the burden
of proof on the prosecution, which is, in effect, to cast upon it,
a load it can never throw off. However numerous its witnesses, they cannot counteract a doubt resting on matters of
mere opinion, unless their testimony is reinforced by the
prejudices of the jury. This is to leave us without any sure
criterion, and at the mercy of the thugs who have made this
country the one where human life is held cheapest. In short,
the tendency of such a doctrine is to encourage the commission
of crime, by rendering its punishment more difficult, and to
remove another of the few remaining safeguards of society.
Fortunately, however, this does not establish the law for the
States ; and there are still places where the sounder rule prevails, which this court, in its tender consideration for the
murderer, has discarded.
Under the Ballot Act of Missouri (Acts Mo. 189 1,p. 134, 4,)
which provides, that the names of candidates, nominated by each
lections,
party, shall be grouped together on the proper balBallots,
Preparation, lot, and each group be headed by the name of the
Printingname political party, by which the candidates comprising
of candidate the group were placed 'in nomination, a person
nominated by
two or more

parties

named as a candidate by different political parties
is entitled to have his name appear upon the bal-

lot in the group headed by the name of each party: Williams
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v. Dalyijple, (Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. I,)
33 S. W. Rep. 447This is in direct opposition to the decision of the Supreme
Court of Wyoming, in Sawin v. Pease, 42 Pac. Rep. 750;
See 35 Air. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 9 ; but seems founded -on
better reason. The only valid objection urged, in the latter
case, against the printing of the name more than once was the
danger of its being counted twice on the same ballot. But
of this there is little danger, since there is small likelihood
that a voter would go to the trouble of marking the individual
name twice, or that he would mark two groups. And, on the
other hand, if it is not printed twice, the voter might mark a
group in which it was not printed; and the danger that election officers would fail to count it, would then be far greater
than that, in the other case, they would count it twice. Further,
if it were printed twice, it could be counted as a vote, in case
the voter did make the error of marking two groups, quite as
easily as if it were only printed in one, and omitted from the
other.
The provision in the ballot laws, that none but ballots
provided in accordance with the provisions of the act, shall be
counted, does not apply to ballots improperly preBallots,
Validity
pared by the proper officers; and moreover, that
such ballots are not "marked ballots " within the prohibition
of the act: People v. Wood, (Court of Appeals of New York,)
42 N. E. Rep. 536.
The Supreme Court of Indiana has lately ruled, that under
the Revised Statutes of that state of 1894, § 624, which provides, that any voter who declares that, through
Illiterate
Voter,
Ballot
marked by
Election

Officers

inability to read, he is unable to mark his ballot,
may have it prepared by the poll clerks, if a voter
who cannot read, declares that lie can, but asks

the poll clerks to prepare his ballot for him, and they do so,
the ballot will be good: M1ontgoinei, v. Oldham, 42 N. E.
Rep. 474.
The provision of the ballot laws, that permits a voter to
have assistance in marking his ballot, should be liberally construed, since it is that provision alone that saves those acts
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from being unconstitutional. If no such provision existed
illiterate voters would be practicall- disfranchised. Such a
provision is legal, and not in itself unconstitutional on the
ground that it deprives electors, who are physically and educationally unable to vote, of the right to cast secret ballots,
or because it establishes ohvsical and educational qualifications
for voters : Pearson v. Board of Supcrzisors of Brunsic Co..
(W. Va.) 21 S. E. Rep. 483. It has, accordingly, been held that
the voter is the sole judge of his disability, and is not obhged
to state its nature; that his declaration cannot be met and
overthrown by proof of its falsity; and that the election board
is not competent to try the question as to the truth of his
declaration: In re Beaver" Co. ice'iols. 12 Pa. C. C. 227:
s. c., 2 D. R. 275. But the contrary view has met with more
acceptance, and it has been held, under the same statute as in
the preceding case, that the election officers must examine the
voter as to the good faith of his request, if the fact of disability
is challenged, and may refuse it, should the alleged disability
prove to be a palpable mistake, fraud, or subterfuge: In rc
Election Instructions, 2 D. R. (Pa.) i. So, in Michigan, where
the ballot requires the voter to make oath to his disability,
this provision is regarded as mandatory; and if it is not
complied with, the vote should be rejected in the count.
though no fraud was intended: Ellis v. Rc'nolds, 99 Mich.
538; S. c., 58 N. W. Rep. 483. In the absence of a statutory requisite as to the form of oath, however, any sufficient
form of words will satisfy the statute: State v. Gay, (Minn.) 6o
N. W. Rep. 676. The disability must also be such as is contemplated by the statute; drunkenness, or mere ignorance of

the proper manner of voting, is not such : In re Election
Instructions, 2 D. R. (Pa.) I. Nor is it sufficient for the voter
to allege that he usually uses glasses, but has not brought
them with him: State v. Gay, (Minn.) 6o N. W. Rep. 676.
In the absence of statutory provisions, the voter is not
resLricted in his choice of an assistant, and the board of election officers has no right to so restrict him : In re Beaver Co.
-Elections, 12 Pa. C. C. 227 ; S.C.,2 D.R. 275. But if the statute
requires that the assistance shall be rendered by any special

!':wGIUX's

OF TrHE LAW.

officer, this provision is mandatory, both on the voter and the
officer; the former can have no other assistant, and the latter
must assist the voter, if requested : Pearsonv. Board of Supervisors of Brunswick Co., (W. Va.) 21 S. E. Rep. 483. In such
a case, a ballot is not invalidated by the fact that a judge of
election, who, before his appointment, received money from a
candidate and advocated his cause at the polls, prepared it in
the interest of that candidate: Hanscom v. Lockhart, (Tex.)
31 S. W. Rep. 547.
If the statute requires two officers to assist a voter, who is
unable to prepare his own ballot, the fact that he was, in fact,
assisted by one only, will not affect the validity of the baillot, if
there is no provision for the rejection of such a ballot: Hanscorm v. Lockhtart, (Tex.) 31 S. W. Rcp. 547.
If the assistant prepares the bpllot in any manner other than
that authorized by the voter, the vote may, of course, be
rejected,if the fraud is discovered; but when a voter, who could
read, intending to vote for one candidate, directed his assistant
to prepare his ballot, according to a written " guide " given to
the assistant, and the latter marked it for another candidate, it
was held that, in the absence of anything to show whether the
mistake was. due to the design of the officer or an error in the
"guide," the vote should not be rejected for fraud: Hanscom
v. Lockhart, (Tex.) 31 S. W. Rep. 547.

If a telephone wire has been negligently allowed to drop
across the trolley wire of an electric street railway company,
the latter is jointly liable with the owner of the
Electric
Railways,
telephone wire for injuries to a third person acciLiability
dentally coming in contact with it, carried by the
current of electricity conveyed through it from the trolley
wire: City Electric Street Railway Co. v. Conery, (Supreme
Court of Arkansas,) 33 S. W. Rep. 426.

In Strachan v. The Universal Stock Erchange, L'td,
[1895] 2 Q. B. 697, the Court of Appeals of England has
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I0
Gaming,

recently decided, that, under the Gaming Act of

Recovery
Wager, of

1845, which enacts that " no suit shall be brought
or maintained in any court of law or equity for

Gambling,
Margins

recovering any sum of money or valuable thing.
. . .. which shall have been deposited in the

Stock

hands of any person to abide the event on which any wager
shall have been made," when it appears, in an action to recover
back money deposited as cover for differences that might arise
on gambling transactions in stgcks and shares, it appeared that
the money was treated by the defendants, to the plaintiff's
knowledge, as appropriated to meet his losses to the defendants, and that the whole amount had been so appropriated
before the plaintiff gave notice to terminate the gambling
transaction, the plaintiff could not recover; for the statute
applies equally to money or valuable things deposited with the
other party to the bet, as to those deposited with a stakeholder.

We have been favored with a copy of the decision of
Chancellor Martin, of the Chancery Court of Pulaski County,
Injunction,

Arkansas, overruling the demurrer to the injunc-

To Restrain
Criminal
Acts

simmons prize-fight.

tion issued by him to restrain the Corbett-Fitz-

The whole opinion is much

to be commended for its sound commonsense and clear statement of legal principles; but is unfortunately too long to
print in extenso. The following are the salient parts of it:
"The question ofjurisdiction of the subject-matter is one about which,
without investigation,

there may exist a difference of opinion; but I

think any lawyer, who will studiously and impartially investigate the
question, and who will apply logic to research, keeping in mind the
extraordinary powers of a Chancery Court, will conclude that such jurisdiction is not wanting.
The act of 1885 makes the Chancellor of the Pulaski Cl'ancery Court

a conservator of the peace throughout the state. Acts of 1885, p. 172.
And our Supreme Court says that what a judge of a court presided
w by a single judge may do in vacation, the court may do in term
time: Patton v. Vaughn, 39 Ark. 211; Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246.
'A conservator is a preserver; one who has the care or office of keeping
from detriment.' Worc. Dict.
'A conservator of the peace is one who has an especial duty by virtue
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-ofhis office to see that the sovereign's peace be kept.' Bouv. Law Dict.
p. 328.
'Under the act of ISS5 and secs. 2380 of S. & H. Dig., I believe it is
conceded that this court might have put Corbett and Fitzsimmons under
bonds to keep the peace, in sums not exceeding $5,o0o; and from this, it
is argued that no jurisdiction exists to do more. The section of the
digest last reierred to, applies to officers of courts of law particularly,
though I doubt not this court also has the power to enforce it in a proper
case. But is that remedy in a court of equity exclusive?
The bill alleges, and the demurrer confesses, that a bond of $5,000,
the maximum bond which, under the statute, could be required,
would not prevent the fight, and would not prevent the other acts complained of in the bill, among them the public nuisance, which isminutely
described. It follows, then, as certainly as night the day, that unless the
Chancellor could apply some other remedy than that of a mere bond to
keep the peace, limited as it is to the sum of $5,ooo, that the power
conferred, and the duty enjoined upon him, would fall far short of
enabling him to adequately maintain the good order of the state government, whose peace he is to conserve.
It were the rankest folly, the sheerest nonsense, to direct an officer
to conserve the peace throughout the state, ai*d then deny him the necessary jurisdiction and power to do so wherever an emergency should arise
which demands the exercise of such powers as may be necessary to
accomplish the purpose. As I will show before I conclude, courts of
equity have exercised jurisdiction by injunction to prevent the commission of certain crimes, indeed, they should of any crime involving the
commission or maintenance of a public nuisance, as does the one charged
in the bill in this case. And why not ? The very objects of government
are to restrain men's passions, to bridle improper and illegal impulses,
to protect them in their civil and political rights of life, limb and
property, to subserve the general welfare, and to induce, or make
them, if necessary, respect the rights of others. 'Tis true, a court of equity,
under our system of laws, cannot administer punitive justice, except for
contempts ; but it may preventive justice in proper cases; and I feel that
if there were more preventive justice administered, a vast deal of misery
would be spared to the innocent. Many a sorrowful wife and innocent,
helpless child has been made to suffer the want of absolute necessaries of
life, because of the father's condemnation to a sentence of punitive justice-under a jail or penitentiary sentence-but never, in the very nature
of things. has one, and one never can, on account of the administration
of preventive justice. In most cases, per force of circumstances, preventive justice cannot be enforced; because, first, the contemplated crime is
not known ; and if it were, it can generally be prevented by the statutory
peace, bond proceeding in a court of law. lEut there are exceptiors to
the rule ; and the exception proves the rule. Courts of equity will not,
generally, interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of ordinary
crimes, and this is upon the principle that an adequate remedy exists at
law. But what have we here as shown by the complaint and confessed
by the demurrer? A comparatively small part of the state in league
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with a few prize-fighters and their trainers, bonded together in a collusive
determination to openly violate the statutes of the state, flinging defiance
in its face, and saying to the constituted authorities of the state government, ,we will be protected by local authorities, and you are powerless
to vindicate the majesty of your laws, to preserve the good name of the
state, to uphold its institutions, or to conserve its peace.'
The Governor has run the gamut of executive functions to find legal
power or authority, lodged in him as the chief executive, to lay hold of the
threatened infraction of the statutes, and by reason of the restrictive constitutional limitations upon his power, he could legally do nothing, without the aid of some court, to accomplish a proper conservation of the
peace in that part of Arkansas' domain. The Attorney-General of the
state for a few days preceding the day fixed for the fight was in the city
of Hot Springs-on the ground-and on his return filed the bill in this
case, which was by him duly verified.
He says in the bill of complaint "that in open defiance of the laws of
the state, of its peace and good order, of its good name and general welfare, all the defendants herein, and many others whose names are to the
plaintiff unknown, undertook such measures as were deenied necessary
by them to bring about said fight in said Garland County, in or near said
city of Hot Springs. They publicl3y boldly and defiantly proclaimed
that said fight would occur.
They advertised the fact throughout
the entire country that the fight would occur for the championship of
the world, and in every way and by all means, sought to induce persons
to come from all over the land to witness the fight. and openly stated
that the attendance would be some fifty thousand people; that accommodations would be made to seat that number to view the fight."
He also avers in the bill 'that if said fight occurs, it will seriously
endanger the lives of the participants who are gifted with extraordinary
strength and skill, fight for a very large stake, as well as for the championship of the world, and entertain feelings of intense hostility towards
each other. That it will bring together from all parts of the country a
lawless, violent, turbulent and dangerous assemblage of many thousand
of persons, and will cause riots and affrays, seriously endangering the
safety of many others, to the prejudice of the good name and general
welf-ire of the state. That the assemblage and fight contemplated would
constitute a public nuisance. which would endanger not only the lives
of persons not engaged or participating in it, but property generally;
and if the Governor of the state exercises his power to call out the
milikia, its efforts to prevent the fight will be resisted and many persons
will be injured, perhaps killed, as defendants, their aiders and abettors,
now declare."
Can it be rationally conceived that any government would so frame itslaws as to render itself powerless to maintain its peace and compel an
. observance of its statutes? Such a doctrine is utterly at variance with
the idea of sovereignty. The three departments of government, executive, legislative and judicial. were created, inter alia, for purposes of
maintaining order in society, and of enforcing sound and wholesome
rules for its regulation ; and the power to formulate and enforce measures
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that are necessary to do this, must be lodged somewhere. It is conceded,
under our law in its present state, not to be vested in the executive in a
case like this; nor in the law courts, by reason of their want of power to
do more than put the parties under bond to keep the peace in a sum
which is wholly inadequate to accomplish the purpose. It follows, that
unless a court of equity has jurisdiction to prevent the contemplated acts
complained of, there is practically no remedy, and the state would be
powerless to prevent its laws being treated with contempt, and unable to
put a quietus upon a vaunted defiance of its sovereignty and authority.
Moreover, as has already been stated, preventive justice is preferable to
all species of justice, where it is obtainable. This proposition is sustained
by reason, a sense of humanity, and an abundance of authorities: See
Champ v. AKendrick, 13o Ind. 549; Fletcher v. Humnble, 67 Ind.444;
McAfee v. Reynolds. 8.L. R. A. 2 1; Mfoss v. Mi1oss. 44 Vt. 84; Enlglish
v. Smock, 7 Am. Rep. 215.
However, we need not resort to any consideration of a public necessity
to maintain the laws and dignity of the state, nor to that principle of
equity jurisprude-.ce, that courts of chaucery will intervene to prevent a
multiplicity of suits, to sustain the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter of this action. While conceding that courts of equity have
no power to enforce the criminal statutes of the state, and no jurisdiction
to injoin the commission of crimes ordinarily, yet where the crime arises
from, or is a constituent part of a public nuisance, they should not fail to
exercise their extraordinary powers to abate the nuisance ; and in doing
this. they- may, by proper orders, prevent the commission of the crime.
Vice-Chancellor Shadwell so thought when he delivered his opinion in
Altowei-Gene;ralv. R. CO.. 4 De G. & S. 75.
Chsncellor J. Howard, in Col. Athletic Club v. State, 28 L. R. A. 727, in
considering the question of injoining a prize-fight, says: " Extraordinary
etncrgencie in many cases call for extraordinary remedies." In Chapter
29 of the -¢:ork from which we have quoted, [REDFIELD ON R.ILw.YS,]
Judge Re,.fi.ld, both in the text and in the notes, gives numerous instances of the interposition of equity to prevent threatened wrongs on
the part of cr.rporations. The rule to be observed in such cases is quoted
at page 3 . from Lord Chancellor Cottenham : "That it is the duty of
courts of equity (and the same is true of all courts and of all institutions)
to adapt its practice and course of proceedings, as far as possible, to the
existing state of society, and to apply its jurisdiction to all those new
cases which, from. the progress daily making in the affairs of men, must
continually arise, and not. from too strict adherence to forms and rules
established under very different circumstances, decline to administer justice, and to enforce rights, for which there is no other remedy .... "
The case of Columbia Athletic Club v. State, 2S L R. A. 727, from which
a number of quotations have been made, and in which several cases cited
in this opinion are used, was one instituted to enjoin an athletic association from "pulling off" an industriously advertised prize-fight and to
put the property of the association in the hands of a receiver. The Chief
Justice, who delivered the opinion of the court, affirmed thejudgment of
the lower court in making the injunction perpetual, and going a step
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farther than I have gone in this case, by appointing a receiver to take
charge of the club house and grounds of the association, in order to
prevent the fighting of the pugilists, says: "It would be monstrous to
adjudge that, because acts constituting the abuse of corporate privileges
are crimes, therefore the corporation may persist in doing them. This
would be to encourage corporations to perpetuate the gravest abuses,
since, under such a rule, the graver the abuse the less the power of the
civil branch of our law. It comes with an ill grace from a corporation to
aver that, because the abuse of its corporate privileges consist of committing crime, civil remedies are unavailable. It would outrage common
sense unspeakably to give ear to a corporation defending itself against a
civil proceeding by asserting its own infamy and insisting that redress
can only be had under the laws punishing the crimes." A like conclusion was reachVd in assachusetts, in the case of Carleton v. Rugg, 149
Mass. 550, 5 L. R. A. 193, the language of the court being: " The fact
that keeping a nuisance is a crime does not deprive a court of equity of
the power to abate the nuisance." See, also, Morawetz Priv. Corp., par.
1043.....
"Judge Brewer, in re Petition of Debs, 158 U. S. 564, for the Supreme
Court of the United States, says: The jurisdiction of the court of chancery
with regard to public nuisances is founded on the irreparable damage to individuals, or the great public injury which is likely to ensue. 3 Daniell's
Ch. Pr. 3d ed., Perkin's, 1740. Indeed, it may be affirmed that in
no well-considered case has the power of the court of equity to interfere
by injunction in cases of public nuisance been denied, the only denial
ever being that of a necessity for the exercise of that jurisdiction under
the circumstances of that particular case. Story's Eq. Jur. par. 921,
923, 924; Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. par. 1349; High on Injunctions, par. 745
and 1554; 2 Daniell's Ch. P1. and Pr. 4th ed., p. 1636."
That the complaint filed by the Attorney-General in this case alleges
facts which constitute a menace to the lives of citizens, with destruction
of their property, the disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the
community, the general welfare and reputation of the state, and a great
public nuisance, calling for the exercise of all the legitimate powers of
this court to abate and prevent the consummation of the threats alleged
in the bill, I think, is not open to question .....
Recurring to the remedy, I find that in cases of public nuisances, it
must be either preventive or punitive, the one accomplished by injunction, and the other by an indictment on behalf of the public.
The most efficient, humane and flexible remedy is that of injunction.
Under this form the court can prevent that from being done which, if
done, would cause a nuisance; it can command an observance of peace
before it is broken ; it can save suffering, and sometimes disgrace, to
those who are in no way responsible; in some instances, and I believe
tfis cape presents one of them, it can secure an obedience to the laws of
the country that a court of law, pursuing the other remedy, could not do.
MIy conclusions are:
LI
That jurisdiction over the persons of such of the defendants as
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-voluntarily came into Pulaski County, and were summoned here, is
given by the statute quoted in this opinion ;
(2) That the complaint charges such a state of facts as constitute a
public nuisance in the eyes of the laws of this state;
(3) That the demurrer admits the material allegations of the complaint to be true;
(4) That a court of equity has ample jurisdiction to prevent, or
abate by injunction, a public nuisance, in a civil action instituted by the
sovereign on the relation of her Attorney-General ;
(5) That the power to prevent or abate the nuisance involves the
jurisdiction to make all orders that may be necessary, and that of a preventative character, to effectuate the orders for prevention or abatement;
and this involves the jurisdiction to enjoin the commission of a crime
which inheres in, or constitutes a part of the nuisance.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Fidelity & Casualty
Ins. Co. of -Y K v. Eickhoff, 65 N. W. Rep. 35 1, has lately
decided some very interesting points of law in
Insurance,
Fidelity,
relation to fidelity insurance,-a b-anch of the law
rer
which is as yet but po6rly defined. The court
Against

Employe

held, (i) That a stipulation between the plaintiff,
(the insurer,) and the defendant,
the employe

whose fidelity was assured, that the voucher or other evidence
of payment by the plaintiff to the employer should be conclusive evidence against the defendant as to the fact and extent
of his liability to indemnify the plaintiff, was void, as against
public policy, in so far as it makes the voucher or other
evidence of payment conclusive; and (2) That, since the contract guaranteeing the employe's fidelity was executed at the
request of the defendant, his obligation to indemnify the plaintiff
was coextensive with the obligation of the plaintiff to indemnify
the employer; and that any provisions in the contract between
the plaintiff and the employer which were binding on the
plaintiff, in favor of the employer, were equally binding on the
defendant, in favor of the plaintiff.
In the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circiiit, the personal representatives of one who, when sane,
Insurance, deliberately kills himself, with the intent of securLife,
in- to his estate the amount of insurance he has
SAucide of
effected on his life, cannot recover the insurance
Assured

money, though the policy contains no provisions
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respecting suicide: Ritter v. 1futual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
7o Fed. Rep. 954.
vinced.

One must read this case to be uncon-

In a recent case in the Supreme Court of Indiana, it appeared,
on a trial for peddling without a license, that the defendant
was one of a number of so-called distributing
agents, within the state, of a New York firm.
PeAders
These agents received orders for the goods sold
Agents
by the firm, and sent them to the general agent of
the firm within the state, who forwarded them to the firm
in New York, and received the goods from there. He
repacked them, (in the state,) and sent them to tile di-tributing
agents, who delivered them to their customers. On this state
of facts, the court held that the defendant should be regarded
as engaged in interstate commerce, since the goods never
became mingled with the mass of property in the state, and
therefore was not liabie to the penalty imposed for the offence
charged : Citi' of H'tiag-dzo: V. J3Ld.an, 42 N. E. Rep. 463.
When an agent merely solicits orders by sample for a foreign
dealer, who, on receihing them, fills them and forwards the
goods ordered directly to the purchaser, so that they are never
in the possession or control of the agent, the agent is universally acknowledged to be within the protection of the interstate commerce clause, and is not liable to a penalty for failure
to take out a license required by the laws of the state or the
ordinances of the municipality, in which he carries on his
agency: Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; S. C., 14 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 829, reversing 143 Pa. 642: S. C., 22 Atl. Rep.
893 ; It re Roaelle, 57 Fed. Rep. I55 ; State of Louisiana v.
Lagarde, 6o Fed. Rep. 186; In rc Mitchell, 62 Fed. Rep.
576. On the other hand, it is equally well settled that an
agent who sells goods, which he has previously received firom
a foreign source, whether as a general practice, or only on
certain occasions, is not engaged in interstate commerce, and
must take out a license, or pay the penalty prescribed for
failure to do so : Emert v. Aissouri, 156 U. S. 296; s. c., 15
Sup. Ct. Rep. 367, affirmifng 103 Mo. 241 ; S. c., 15 S. W.
Interstate

Commerce,
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Rep. 8 1; State v. Sn? ,dy,
(Io.) 31 S. W. Rep. 36. There is
of course, a wide range of debatable ground between these two
settled rules ; but since it is also well established that when
goods imported into the state j.1
the original package are sold
inthat package, without b~eakiag it, they are'subjecis of interstate commerce, without regard to the manner of, sale LeiV
V. Hardn, 135 U. S. IOO; an. when th4t pacage is, in,
an
way b -ken, the goods becople a part of the geaeral mass ofproperty ipthe state, and are subjects of inter-state commerce:
Statev. Parsons, 124 Mo. 436S; S.c. U S.W.Rep. 102
Haley,v. State, (Neb.) P9 N. W. Rep. 962. See 34 AM. L. REG.
& R~v. (N. S.) i ,
w ould seem that an ageilt may sell
goods previously shipped to him in the original package, by
delivery at the time
out being liable to the
contract, withu b
hal o the
penalty for failure to take out a license. In the case of goods
previously delivered, therefore, the liabilit of the agent depends
on the definition of an original package. If, however, the
gpds are only delivered in answer to orders given, and the
agent acts merely as a medium of transmission between the
k
Vedrand the purchasr the question of orig nal package
v4ndor
does not apply, and the agent is not liable, no matter how
much that package is broken before the final delivery to the
purchaser. Such was the case in hand.
',
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The Supreme Court of Texas, while discarding the venerable rule of thp common law, that a taxpayer of a municipal
corporation has such an interest in a suit between ,
I
I , ''I,
Judge,
the corporation and another party as disqualifies
Disqua.fica.
tion,
him to sit as a judge in the case, yet adopts subTaxpayer

stantially the same rule, under the provision of
the Constitution of Texas, Art. 5, II, that " no judge shall
sit in any case inwhich he may be interested," with the quali-_
fication that the interest that disqualifies, must be a pecuniary
interest, i. e., -one that can be measured by a pecuniary standard. In that state, therefore, a judge who isa taxpayer in a
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city is disqualified to sit in any case, in which a judgment for
money can be rendered for or against the city, if he has a
direct interest in that judgment, due to the fact of his being a
taxpayer, no matter how slight that interest may be: City of
Austin v. Nalle, 85 Tex. 520; S. C., 22 S. W. Rep. 668,
96o. This has been recently extended to include a suit to
annul the corporation and remove its officers: State v. City of
Cisco, (Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.) 33 S. W. Rep. 244;
but it does not apply to a case in which the interest of the
taxpayer is remote and contingent; and therefore a judge,
who is a taxpayer, is not disqualified to sit on the trial of an
action against a city for personal injuries, caused by its negligence, nor on the hearing of an appeal in such a case: City of
Dallas v. Peacock, (Supreme Court of Texas,) 33 S. W. Rep.
220.

This distinction seems rather farfetched. The distinction made
between City of Austin v. Nalle, 85 Tex. 534; S.C., 22S. W. Rep.
668,960, and City of Dallasv. Peacock,(Tex.) 33 S. W. Rep. 220,
is, that, in the former, the suit was to cancel an issue of bonds,
which, if successful, would increase the taxes to be levied; while
in the latter, no such result could be anticipated. But the only
thing that went to show that the taxes in the first case would
be increased was the fact that the total issue of bonds was
about $1,4oo,ooo ; if it had been only $5,ooo, there could have

been no such presumption. So, in the second case, the only
thing that showed that the taxes would not be increased, was
that the recovery was for only $3,000; if it had been for
$i,OOo,OOO the presumption of increased taxes would have

been as strong as in the first case. It is clear therefore, that
the court, by failing to analyze its own rationesdecidendi,committed the error of resting its decision on the very ground
that it declared could not affect the decision,-the amount of
the interest; for this, as is shown above, was the real basis on
which the nearness or remoteness of the interest has been
Test d. This test, therefore, is fallacious, and the only solid
ground on which we can rest, is either the broad principle that
any interest disqualifies, or that no interest except such as is
direct, immediate and personal, will have that effect.
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It may, perhaps, prevent some unskilled practitioner from
making a futile objection, to know that husbands, whose wives
are second cousins, are not related by affinity,
Jurors,
Disquaifica- within a statute disqualifying persons related
within
tion,
certain degrees of affinity from serving as jurors
Affinity
on the trial of a cause to which their
affinities
parties : Tegarden v. Pillips,(Appellate Court of Indiana,) are
42
N. E. Rep. 549. The case contains an excellent resum6 of
the law on the subject.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealtl v. Emterson, 42 N. E. Rep. 559, has lately held, that
the statute of that state of 1884, c. 277, which
Lotteries,
Gift
makes it a penal offence to sell property on any
Enterprises
representation "that anything other than what is
specifically stated to be the subject of the sale, is to be delivered,"
does not apply to nor prohibit the sale of tobacco under a
promise to give a photograph to each purchaser of a package,
though a purchaser is allowed to select his photograph from
among a number.
In Tz rc Craig-, 7o Fed. Rep. 969, the Circuit Court for the
District of Kansas has decided, that the Act of Conrres j.^
March 3, 1873, § ii, (Rev. Stat. IL. S. § 1361,)
Martial Law
vhich provides that prisoners under confinement
Persons
subject ' in military prisons to undergo sentences of courtthereto

martial, shall be liable to trial and punishment by
court-martial, for offences committed during that confinement,
is not in contravention of the Fifth Amendment, which declares
that no person not in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury ;
and that that statute applies to a person confined in a military
prison, though, at the time of his sentence to such confinemnt,
he was also sentenced to be discharged from the service.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has lately
reversed the decision of Justice Bradley, of the Supreme
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Court of that district, discharging Captain Armes
from imprisonment under the Articles of War.
The facts of the case are well known. Captain
Armes sent to General Schofield x letter, charging
Z
him with persecution of the writer, alleging various

wrongful acts committed by him, and demanding an apology.
He was thereupon arrested, and confined at the Washington
Barracks, from which he was released on habeas corpus.
The important parts of the decision of the Court of Appeals
are as follows :
"This case is not that of a civilian ruthlessly imprisoned by arbitrary
military authority. The appellee is an officer of the Army of the United
States, entitled to wear its uniform and to draw pay as such, and by
express provision of the statute law of the United States for the government of the Army, made subject to the Rules and Articles of War and to
trial by court-martial for any infraction of those articles. (Rev. Stat. U. S.
1256.)
Nor is the force of the statute broken by the fact that the
duties of a retired officer, such as the appellee is, are of an exceedingly
limited character, being restricted substantially to drawing his pay,
reporting his place of residence to the War Department monthly. and
being assignable to duty at the Soldier's Home and at his own request to
duty as professor in any college ; and that, subject to these restrictions, a
retired officer of the Army may enter into any private business into which
he ,chooses to embark, not inconsistent with his duties to the United
States. in the nature of things, some of the Articles of War cannot
apply to retired officers, for the reason that, either in express terms or by
necessary implication, they concern the duties of those in active service.
But, so faL ab ta e Articles of War can be applicable to the retired officers
of the Army, the statute unquestionably makes these latter subject to
them and to all the processes of the military law, for all offences committed
by them in violation of these articles.
Now, it cannot reasonably be doubted that the charges against the
appellee, in this case, are of offences against the military law of which
retired officers, as well as officers in the active service, may be equally
guilty. These are (i) Conduct to the prejudice of good order and mili-.
tary discipline ; -nd (2) Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman ;
and the specification under each charge is the statement of the exceedingly intemperate and improper letter, written by the appellee to the
General Commanding the Army, which is set forth in full in the appellant's return to the writ served upon him. If there were any occasion to
conjecture what the purpose of Congress was in holding retired officers
&f-tl'e Army to trial by court-martial for infractions of military law, and
what the offenses were which it was contemplated they might commit,
no better illustration could be afforded of the subject than the offenses
here charged against the appellee. It would be difficult to conceive a
case to which the statute would be more appropriate.
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The appellee, therefore, being an officer of the Army, although on the
retired list, and subject as such to trial by court-martial for violation of
the Articles of War, and the charges against him being for offences
against these Articles such as have been stated, his arrest to answer those
charges was right and proper. Actual arrest, or some equivalent of it,
is an essential prerequisite under our system of criminal jurisprudence to
the exercise of jurisdiction by any court having cog-nizance of criminal
causes. It is an elementary principle in our law that no man is to be
tried for crime in his absence. The arraignment of an accused person
in court to hear the charge against him and to respond to it, is essential to
give validity to any proceeding thereon against him; and the only mode
known to our law to secure the presence of such accused person for the
purpose is by arrest. It is very true that an accused person niay cegtilin
and voluntarily surrender himself; and that thereupon a court may pio-.:
ceed without the usual preliminarv arrest. But upon his surrender, he is
in fact and in contemplation of law under arrest, and subject to detention. This is the law with respect to offe-nces cognizable by the ordinary
tribunals of the common law; anid we see no reason why it should not be
held to be the law with regard to offences cognizable by court-martial.
But.we are not left to mere inference in this matter. For Article 65 of
the Articles of War specifically provides that "officers charged with
crime shall be arrested." It is vain to argue that the term crime here is
to be taken in the technical sense of a felony; for no such distinction is
justified by the Articles of War or by the dictates of reason.
It is very plain to us, therefore, that the appellee, as a retired officer
of the Army of the United States, was subject to arrest and detention by
the military authorities to answer before a court-martial on the charges
preferred against him. Nor is this conclusion invalidated in the slightest
degree by the proposition laid down by some of the writers on military
law to this effect: "Arrest is not an essential preliminary to a military
trial; to give the court jurisdiction it is not necessary that the accused
should have been arrested : it is sufficient if he voluntarily, or in obedience
to an order directing him to do so, appears and submits himself to
trial; " for this means no more than that an officer may voluntarily place
himself under arrest, just as any person accused of offence under the
common law may come in and submit himself to authority without formal
arrest in the regular way. It would be absurd to conclude that arrest is
improper, because the accused might come in voluntarily or upon mere
notice, and submit to trial without arrest.
But it is argued that the arrest of the appellee, in this case, was illegal,
because he was taken by the military authorities from his own house and
confined in military barracks belonging to the United States, which constituted the nearest military post. In this argument, it seems to be forgotten that the appellee is not a civilian, but an officer of the Army of
the United States, subject to trial by court-martial, and to such arrestand
detention as will secure his presence before such court-martial. It might
well be questioned whether it would be proper for the military authorities
to convert the appellee's residence into a temporary prison for his detention, and to station a guard before it. Such an exercise of the right of
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arrest might subject the military authorities to grave criticism and censure. If the military authorities had the right under the law and the
Articles of War to arrest the appellee, as we hold they had, and to detain
him for trial before a court-martial, it is not apparent to us how the place
of this detention can become a material question so as to affect the validity of the arrest.
Article 65 of the Articles of War, already cited, provides as follows:
" Officers charged with crime shall be arrested and confined to their
barracks, quarters, or tents, and deprived of their sword by the commanding officer. And any officer, who leaves his confinement before he
is set at liberty by his commanding officer, shall be dismissed from the
service." ....
Arrest is one thing; custody or detention, another.
Where arrest
is authorized, and there is no specific or sufficient provision for detention,
such reasonable means of custody may be used as are available. If there
is no jail in a county or judicial district, or none available, a sheriff may
confine a prisoner in his own house, or in any other place which may be
reasonably proper under the circumstances for the purpose. And for
the same reason, when an officer of the Army is arrested who has no
barracks, quarters, or tents, it is not apparent why he should not be confined in the barracks, quarters or tents most available, those of the nearest
military post. The military authorities are entitled to have the custody
of his person ; and there is no place where they can more properly have
that custody than at their nearest military post.
Moreover, even if there is excess or abuse in the mode of the detention of an accused person, it does not follow that the excess or abuse may
be remedied by the writ of habeas corpus. Such excess or abuse is not
without remedy; but it must be a very grave and unusual case that
would justify recourse to the writ of habeas coipus for the total discharge
of the prisoner from all confinement .....
But it is urged, in the next place, that the detention of the appellee,
without the existence of charges, invalidated his arrest and confinement.
If by this is meant that, before an officer of the Army of the United States
can be placed under arrest and held for trial under the Articles of War,
formal charges in writing, with specifications in due form, such as are
set forth in the record in this case, must have been preferred against him,
the position is not tenable for a moment. Lord Coke seems to have
thought that, at the common law, indictment or information was necessary before there could be a lawful arrest. But that theory was repudiated long ago; in fact, very soon after it was advanced; and it has
long been the settled law, both of England and the United States, that
indictment or information is never required in any case as a pre-requisite
to arrest and detention. Warrant is required in some cases, with affidavit
or other testimony to support it, to justify an arrest ; and in other cases,
thetac may be an arrest without warrant.
There is no reason to hold that it is different in the military law.
That law can not be more jealous of the liberty of its officers than is the
common law of the liberty of its citizens. The fact of the commission of
apparent crime or offence is the primary ground for arrest in either system
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of jurisprudence. In either system, when an officer, charged with the duty
of making arrests, has personal knowledge that an offence has been committed, he is entitled to arrest without warrant, or without the issue of
formal order to that effect, as the case may be. The exigencies of the
military service imperatively demand that, when an offence against the
Articles of War has been committed in the presence of a commanding
officer, he should have the right immediately to place the offender under
arrest. Both the General Commanding the Army and the Secretary of
War have the right; and whether the offence charged against the appellee be regarded as having been committed in the presence of the
General Commanding the Army or of the Secretary of War, in both
which capacities General Schofield was acting at the time, it is clear
that in either capacity he was entitled to order the offender under instant
arrest. The offence was flagrant. Whatever reason the appellee may
have had for thinking that he had justification or provocation for his
conduct, his letter on its face was a direct personal insult to his commanding officer, and a most grave offence against the military law, committed in the actual presence and in the personal knowledge of that commanding officer; and to hold that that officer was not entitled, if he so
thought proper, to take immediate cognizance of it by directing the
arrest of the offender, would be to nullify the Articles of War, to subvert
the discipline of the Army, and to destroy the efficiency of that body. If
the honor of an officer on the retired list requires vindication, it does not
seem to us that, for that purpose, he is entitled to insult his commanding
officer with impunity, and to escape arrest therefor and be at large, until
specific charges therefor have been formulated and served upon him.
The provisions of Article 71 of the Articles of War fully corroborate
this view. That article provides that "when an officer is put in arrest
for the purpose of trial, the officer, by whose order he is arrested, shall
see that a copy of the charges on which he is to be tried is served upon
him within eight days after his arrest." Now, if the charges have
already been formulated and communicated to him before his arrest, the
service of a copy within eight days thereafter would be a work of most
useless supererogation.
In this connection, also, the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution are invoked, which require that no man shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and
that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. But even
if it be conceded that these provisions apply to persons in the military
service, with regard to which there seems to be some room for question,
their reauirements are satisfied if the arrest has been in accordance with
law and military usage, and formal charges are preferred within a reasonable time after the arrest, which reasonable time the Article of War last
cited has fixed at eight days.
The plain import of the law we conclude to be: i. That when an officer
in the military service commits an offence against the Articles of War in
the presence of his commanding officer, or to the personal knowledge of
that commanding officer, he may forthwith be ordered under arrest and
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detained in suitable military custody, and there is no necessity for any
formal announcement to him of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him for he already knows it;
2. That where a commanding officer does not act upon his own knowledge, but upon statements communicated to him by others, and he prefers without personal investigation to act upon such statements, it is
proper that a retired officer should, at or before the time of his arrest,
and either verbally or in the order of arrest, be advised of the charge
against him ; but such charge need not then be formulated; and the failure to notify the accused in an informal way of the nature of the accusation against him does not render the arrest invalid; provided that in due
time thereafter, that is, within eight days after the arrest, formal charges
are preferred and a copy of the charges is served upon him, according to
the requirement of the statute;
3. That when an officer in the military service is arrested by order of
his commanding officer, with or without cause assigned at the time, and
charges in due form are preferred against him within the prescribed time
thereafter, the proceeding is regular, and the person so arrested is not
entitled to be released upon writ of habeas corous. While this writ may
be used to relieve officers in the military service from illegal detention at
the hands of their commanding officers or of military tribunals, such use
must be with great caution, in view of the special nature of the militarservice and of the contract entered into by those who engage in that service, and who thereby deliberately and for a consideration surrender to a
....
great extent their rights and immunities as citizens-.

It is to be hoped that a perusal of this decision will silence
the jackals of the press, who, with their usual moral and
mental obliquity, saw in General Schofield's just action nothing but an unwarranted invasion of what they are pleased to
consider an inalienable privilege of mankind of their stamp,that of libelling whomsoever they will at their sovereign pleasure, with the degree of irresponsibility only accorded in civilized nations to lunatics and imbeciles.

A railroad engineer and a porter on the train are not
Mlaster and Servant, fellow-servants: Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P.
Fellow-Servants,

Rir. Co. v. Palmer, (Court of Appeals of Ken-

tuckv,) 33 S. AV. Rep. 199.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana has recently decided, that
the executive officers of the state government have no author-

PR06REZ4S OF THE LAW.

Officers,
Executive,
Right to
Disobey
Statute

itv to decline the performance of purely ministerial
duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional for laws are
presumed to be constitutional and legal, until their

unconstitutionality or illegality has been judicially established,
and must be so treated and acted upon by subordinate executive officers; and it was certainly never intended by the
founders of our system of government, that an executive
officer should nullify a law by neglecting or refusing to act
under it: State v. Heard, 18 So. Rep. 746. This decision is
especially recommended to a gentleman named Bowler, who
happens temporarily to hold an office under the United States,
and to all others who, in the furore of their little brief
authority, imagine that their official position invests them with
authority to act according to their own caprice.
A railroad company has the right to cancel a pass issued by
it to an individual, in consequence of fraudulent representations
by a third person, if the one to whom it is issued
Railroads,
has knowledge of the fraud: and the fact that the
Passes,
Cancellation conductor permits him to retain it, after informing
him that he has been ordered to take it up, will not amount to
a waiver of this right, when accompanied bp"a warning, which
the holder of the pass does not act on, that he had better see
about it at the railroad office. In such a case the conductor,
on the passenger's refusal to pay fare on a subsequent trip, may
take up the pass and eject him from the car, if he uses no more
force than is necessary for the purpose : Moore v. Ohio River
R. R. Co., (Court of Appeals of West Virginia,) 23 S. E.
Rep. 539.
The Supreme Court of Florida has lately held, in accordance with the prepofiderance of authority, that when one house
Statutes,

Z
of the legislature originates and passes a bill through

Passage,

the three readings required by the constitrciwfi,

Adoption by

and reports it to the other house, which passes it

Amendment
made by other

with the addition of amendments germane to its
general subject, either to the body or title of the

one House of

re
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bill, it is not necessary that the house in which the bill originated should do anything more than simply concur by vote
in the amendments made. It is unnecessary in such a case
to re-read the bill three times again in the house where
it originated: State v. Hockcr, 18 So. Rep. 767. There
is a brief note on this point, in 35 A.n. L. REG. & REV.
(N. S.) 20.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Smith v. Commonwealth, 33 S. W. Rep. 49, has recently refused to set aside
a quotient verdict, settling the amount of a fine
Verdict,
Quotient,
il a criminal prosecution for libel, on the grounds,
that there was no contention that the guilt of the
Criminal
Prosecution

accused was so ascertained; that there was no
contention that the assessment finally agreed on was the
result of any trick by which an excessive verdict was obtained; and that tinder the statutory jurisdiction of the
court in criminal cases, it had no revisory power over the
error complained of.
In Redman v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 333, it was decided
that the Court of Appeals had no power of revision over a
verdict obtained by lot.
In Ellerson v. W/cstott, 42 N. E. Rep. 540, the Court of
Appeals of New York has ruled, that if a devisee under a will
kills the testator for the purpose of realizing under
Wills,
Devise,
the devise, the devise is not thereby rendered void.
Valdity,
The Court cites with approval, however, the case
Murder of
Testator

, 1/cl
15 N_ Y. 514; S. C., 22 N.
of Rig--s v.
E. Rep. 88, as establishing the doctrine
that
equity may. in such a case, interfere to deprive the devisee of
the fruits of his crime.
There is a note on this subject, in 34 A.\I. L. REG. & REV.
(N. S.) 636.
by Devisee

-

According to a recent decision of the court last mentioned,
if a patient, who has been attended by two physicians at the
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Competency,
Privileged
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same consultation, calls one of them to testify in
her behalf in regard to the nature of the injuries
received by her in an accident for which she sues,

Communica.

she thereby waives her right to demand that the
other physician shall not testify to that matter;
and the defendant may call him to testify in regard thereto :
Morris v. N. Y., 0. & W. Ry. Co., 42 N. E. Rep. 41o, affirming 26 N. Y. Suppl. 312.
tions,

Waiver

ARDENIUS STEWART.

